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**WORKING DOCUMENT**

Strategic approach to the management of African Swine Fever for the EU

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***Strategic approach to the management of African Swine Fever for the EU – Rev. October 2018***

1. ***Introduction***

The Strategic approach to the management of African Swine Fever for the EU (ASF Strategic approach) has been developed with the aim of establishing harmonised measures in response to the epidemiological situation with regard to African swine fever (ASF) in the EU.

The ASF Strategic approach is aimed to all Member States affected by the disease and to Member States free from the disease. It is intended to prevent and control the spread of the disease and eventually to eradicate the disease in the affected territories. This aim should be achieved by the application of harmonised measures, tailored to the specificity of each Member States, concerning among others wild boar metapopulation and pig herds.

Specific measures are foreseen to manage the wild boar population in free Member States and in free areas of already affected Member States, as well as for the introduction of the disease in wild boar in any newly infected area. Indeed, the approach could differ from area to area and based on the time the disease has been present in a given area.

In addition to the measures foreseen by the strategy, additional legal requirements apply based on the epidemiology of the disease and other measures put in place such as after detection of an outbreak in domestic pig holding the establishment of protection and surveillance zones, the infected area[[1]](#footnote-2) in case of first case of ASF in wild boar population or the measures foreseen in the EU ASF regionalisation[[2]](#footnote-3).

The measures pertaining to wild boar management are intended for all EU Member States with the aim of providing the basis for a coherent approach to the management of this wildlife resource. Even in absence of ASF, a long term planning is required to control the wild boar metapopulations[[3]](#footnote-4) and ensure an optimal coordination with national resources involved in wildlife conservation.

The Annex I provides for key messages tailored to different target audiences in relation ASF; these should constitute the baseline for to setting up national awareness campaigns.

The Annex II highlights the main measures that should be implemented in the Member States that are free from ASF.

Annex III summarises the ASF Main measures for management of wild boar populations in the context of ASF control measures, described in section c.

The measures established in this Strategic approach should be applied until the end of 2021 and reviewed following the developments in the epidemiological situation and scientific findings.

1. ***ASF measures to be applied for domestic pigs at least in the areas covered by Decision 2014/709/EU*** 
   * 1. Pig farms are classified in three categories:
2. *Non- commercial farms (NCF):* farms where pigs are kept only for fattening for own consumption and neither pigs nor any of their products leave the holding.
3. *Commercial farms (CF):* farms which sell pigs, send pigs to a slaughterhouse or move pig products off the holding.
4. *Outdoor farms:* farms which pigs are kept temporarily or permanently outdoor.
   * 1. Minimum biosecurity requirements for each category are defined:

I - Biosecurity criteria for non-commercial farms (NCF):

1. No swill feeding and removal of animal by-products in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009.
2. No contact between the pig(s) of the NCF, pigs from other holdings and feral pigs or wild boar. Pigs should be kept in a way that ensures that there is no direct, neither indirect, contact with pigs coming from other holdings or with pigs outside the premises nor with wild boar.
3. No contact to any part of feral pigs (including hunted or dead wild boar/meat/by-products).
4. The owner (or the person in charge of the pigs) should take appropriate biohygienic measures such as change clothes and boots on entering the stable and leaving the stable. Disinfection should be performed at the entrance of the holding and the stable.
5. No hunting activity should be carried out 48h prior being in contact with pigs.
6. No unauthorized persons/transport are allowed to enter the pig holding (stable) and records are kept of people and vehicles accessing the area where the pigs are kept.
7. Home slaughtering is allowed only under veterinary supervision.
8. No sows and/or boar used for reproduction are allowed on the holding (this does not apply to commercial farms).
9. Commercially traded crops, vegetables, hay and straw have a very low ability to contain and maintain infectious ASFV. If the use of locally harvested grass and straw is considered to represent a risk under local prevailing conditions, the following should apply:
   * Ban of feeding fresh grass or grains[[4]](#footnote-5) to pigs unless treated to inactivate ASF virus or stored (out of reach of wild boar) for at least 30 days before feeding.
   * Ban on using straw[[5]](#footnote-6) for bedding of pigs unless treated to inactivate ASF virus or stored (out of reach of wild boar) for at least 90 days before use.
10. Farms buildings should:
    * be built in such a way that no feral pigs or other animals (e.g. dogs) can enter the stable.
    * Allow for disinfection facilities (or changing) for footwear and clothesat the entrance into the stable.

II - Biosecurity criteria for commercial farms:

1. Same criteria as for NCF with, in addition, the following criteria:
2. Stock-proof fencing of at least the stable and premises where feed and bedding are kept.
3. Biosecurity plan approved/recommended by veterinary services according to the profile of farm and national legislation. This biosecurity plan should include, but is not limited to:
   * Establish the clean/dirty areas for personnel appropriate to the farm typology (e.g. changing rooms, shower, eating room).
   * Review, when applicable, the logistical arrangements for entry of new animals into the farm.
   * Detailed procedures for the disinfection of vehicles, fomites and personnel hygiene rules should be established and applied.
   * Set rules on food for workers on site and ban the keeping of pigs at workers’ homes if applicable.
   * Dedicated recurrent awareness programme for all workers on the farm.
   * Review logistical arrangements in order to ensure proper separation between production units. Avoid pigs being in contact (directly or indirectly) with animal by-products and other production units.
   * Internal basic audit or self-evaluation for enforcing the biosecurity measures.

III - Biosecurity criteria for outdoor farms:

Outdoor keeping of pigs is banned.

* + 1. Inspection and investigation regime

Inspection and investigation have to be performed by official veterinarians or contracted/designated veterinarians of the veterinary services. These are to be supported by awareness campaigns addressed to farmers.

Inspections of holdings will take place minimum once per year in the areas listed in the Annex to Commission Decision 2014/709/EU. This area can be further extended based on a risk assessment carried out the competent authority. Inspection means that the veterinarian at task performs a veterinary interview with the farmer and observes and examines the pigs. In case of suspicion samples for laboratory investigations are taken. During the inspection the veterinarians are checking the identification of pigs, biosecurity of the farm and perform a verification of the owner data while performing a census of the pigs.

Investigation will be performed in the whole country. The principle of investigation will be based on an enhanced passive surveillance (examination of pig plus sampling for ASF if appropriate).

* + 1. Recurrent awareness campaigns to target farmers (especially from NCF) should be performed at least for informing about the strategy and the role of the farmer so to encourage their full involvement in implantation of biosecurity rules, rapid reporting and participation in surveillance.
    2. Sampling for laboratory investigations will be performed

1. In case of clinical signs resembling ASF (e.g. fever or haemorrhagic lesions). If necessary, sampling should be repeated to exclude ASF when specific clinical signs occur.
2. Each week, in the form of virological testing of at least the first two deaths (post weaning pigs or pigs older than 2 months) in each production unit.
3. When ante or post-mortem signs raise suspicion at home slaughtering at least within the area covered by Commission Decision 2014/709/EU.
   * 1. Laboratory tests for screening

* qRT-PCR from blood or organs has to be performed always for early detection and confirmation of ASF.
* Ab-ELISA: facultative if epidemiologically relevant (e.g. for research purposes or to date the moment of introduction).
* IPT (immunoperoxidase test): confirmatory test for ASF antibody detection either in serum and exudate tissue samples.
  + 1. Area of application of the measures

Unless stated otherwise above, measure should be applied in the areas listed in the Annex to Commission Decision 2014/709/.

1. ***ASF Main measures for management of wild boar populations in the context of ASF control***

The wild boar population plays an important role in spreading and maintaining African swine fever. Proper wild boar management in areas affected and not affected by the disease is of paramount importance and it demands the development of a common strategy. Hunting practices should be adapted to the epidemiological evolution of the disease due to their effects on the wild boar populations.

As specified in Annex II the wild boar management requires coordination of veterinary services with other stakeholders such as forestry management bodies and hunters and is essential for both prevention, early detection and control of ASF. The measures taken in the framework of this strategy mentioned above will have to be compatible with EU environmental and veterinary legislation, including nature protection requirements and properly assessed in terms of scientific basis, impact and effectiveness.

Recommendations for different areas:

1. Measures to be taken in all areas
2. Free area (far away from infected area)
3. Free area close to infected area
4. Newly infected area
5. Area where the disease is present for more than one year

The approach could differ from area to area and based on the time the disease has been present in a given area. The different phases of the infection can be identified only through a continuous system of passive surveillance for early detection of ASF in wild boar.

The areas should as well take into account the existing wild boar population distribution and densities and the existence of natural or artificial epidemiological barriers.

The main measures for management of wild boar should be implemented as follow:

* + 1. **Measures to be taken in all areas**

Wild boar management practices should be aimed at controlling the wild boar population density. The following points for controlling, and eradicating, ASF in the wild boar population are to be applied in all areas (free areas far from infected areas, free areas close to infected areas, newly infected areas and endemic areas).

1. Sustained feeding of wild boar is prohibited.
2. Baiting is allowed (non-sustained feeding, limited food only for attracting wild boar for trapping and/or culling, not exceed 10kg/km2/month).
3. Targeted hunting is encouraged in order to target adult and sub-adult females. The overall hunting bag should be balanced between male and females (50% each). Priority in reaching the quotas should be given to adult and sub-adult females.
4. The minimum biosecurity requirements for hunters are applied.
   * 1. **Measures to be taken in free areas (far away from infected areas)**
5. Strong reduction of wild boar density needed.
6. Baiting is allowed for trapping.
7. Hunting should be addressed and coordinated by competent authority
8. Targeted hunting is encouraged.
9. Surveillance:
   * 1. Principle of sampling should be based on enhanced passive surveillance: all found carcasses and sick wild boar have to be tested for ASF using PCR.
     2. The competent authority promotes, encourages and sustain the minimum biosecurity requirements for hunters.
     3. Results of tests max within72h from sampling.
10. Trapping for culling and testing for ASF is permitted, carcass for personal consumption if results are negative.
11. Competent authority addresses culling.
12. Fencing depends on epidemiological factors. For large fencing reference should be made to EFSA Scientific Opinion[[6]](#footnote-7). The competent authority addresses the use of fencing.
13. Carcass management should be addressed by competent authority according to specific procedures
14. Restriction of areas is not needed.
    * 1. **Measures to be taken in free areas (close to infected areas)**
15. Intensive hunting to obtain a strong reduction of wild boar density.
16. Baiting is allowed for trapping and for culling.
17. Hunting should be performed at the highest level achievable in that area. CA should encourage wild boar management involving public and private sectors.
18. Driven and solo hunt are allowed.
19. Wild boar management addressed and encouraged through CA oversight (involving public and private sectors) to reach population reduction goals, the hunters are considered part of the strategy.
20. Surveillance:
    * 1. Principle of sampling should be based on enhanced passive surveillance: all found carcasses and sick wild boar have to be tested for ASF using PCR.
      2. Active patrolling to find carcasses (trained staff) in order to reinforce passive surveillance.
      3. Results of tests max within 72h from sampling.
21. Testing of all wild boar found dead. All hunted wild boar tested for ASF Ag detection using PCR.
22. The competent authority promotes, encourages and sustains minimum biosecurity requirements for hunters.
23. Trapping for culling and testing for ASF is permitted, carcass for personal consumption if results are negative.
24. Competent authority addresses culling and trapping.
25. Fencing depends on epidemiological factors. For large fencing reference should be made to EFSA Scientific Opinion[[7]](#footnote-8).The use of fencing should be addressed by competent authority. Small fencing should be considered to facilitate control measures.
26. Disposal of all carcasses
27. Biosecurity in place (hunting grounds fulfil the prescribed biosecurity measures approved by competent authority).
28. Restriction of areas should be managed by CA according to specific procedures.
    * 1. **Measures to be taken in newly infected areas**[[8]](#footnote-9)
29. Baiting is allowed for trapping and for culling.
30. Total ban of wild boar hunting until the epidemic phase has decreased.
31. No driven hunts.
32. Biosecurity measures in hunting grounds applied by all persons searching for and handling wild boar carcasses (e.g. avoid possible contamination of vehicles, yards and houses).
33. Restricted access to the infected area. Only authorised staff in the area. Farmland can have access on the basis of derogation
34. Specific training for hunters to reduce the probability of further spread of the virus in the environment and outside the infected area.
35. Containers to store wild boar carcasses in each hunting ground or at least within the infected area if not possible otherwise. In each storage-point means for cleaning and disinfection have to be available.
36. Trapping for culling and testing is permitted, carcass for personal consumption if results are negative.
37. Culling, by trained hunters, allowed to eradicate when the endemic phase has been reached (after the epidemic phase) and under the supervision of CA. In practice no actions until the decreasing of the epidemic curve is consolidated and identified through a continuous system of passive surveillance.
38. No dressing of the animals (no evisceration). Shot wild boar to be put in plastic bags to minimise the risk of spreading the fluids of the animal.
39. Fencing should be done in defined areas. Timely built to slow down the disease speeding and anticipating the Epi-wave. Addressed to limit the spread.   
    Compliant to EU for environment.
40. Disposal of all carcasses
41. Surveillance:
    * 1. Principle of sampling should be based on enhanced passive surveillance: all found carcasses and sick wild boar have to be tested for ASF using PCR.
      2. Active patrolling to find carcasses (trained staff) in order to reinforce passive surveillance.
      3. Results of tests max within 72h from sampling.
42. Testing for ASF of all wild boar found dead and culled. All hunted wild boar tested for ASF Ag detection using PCR and for Ab detection.
    * 1. **Measures to be taken in area where the disease is present for more than one year**
43. Baiting is allowed for trapping and for culling.
44. Hunting only under strict biosecurity measures finalised to collect samples for testing.
45. Biosecurity required during hunting and carcass removal.
46. Trapping for culling and testing for ASF is permitted, carcass for personal consumption if results are negative.
47. Culling by trained hunters.
48. Fencing not needed.
49. Disposal of all carcasses if positive.
50. Local consumption of wild boar meat after negative testing.
51. Surveillance:
    * 1. Principle of sampling should be based on enhanced passive surveillance: all found carcasses and sick wild boar have to be tested for ASF using PCR.
      2. Active patrolling to find carcasses (trained staff) in order to reinforce passive surveillance.
52. Testing for ASF of all wild boar found dead and culled. All hunted wild boar tested for ASF Ag detection using PCR and for Ab detection.
    * 1. **Minimum biosecurity requirements for hunters and for all staff searching for and handling wild boar carcasses:**

These should be foreseen by the competent authority; at least these aspects should be included every time hunting of wild boar is performed or wild boar carcasses are handled in areas under restriction as defined in Decision 2014/709/EU or in at risk areas :

1. At least one dedicated authorised dressing facility should be available for each hunting ground. The dressing area should be protected against unauthorised access by people and animals, equipped with water, sufficient effective disinfectants available and waste collection equipment. In case dressing area is not present in the hunting ground, then the closest hunting ground with a dressing facility should be used.
2. For each hunting ground a facility/premise should be equipped with refrigerator (or procedures reaching equivalent results in terms of keeping the carcass until laboratory results are available).
3. Hunted wild boar should remain in the premises of the hunting ground until tested; only negative carcasses can be released. To achieve this individual identification of carcasses is required.
4. Offal from hunted wild boar should not be removed from the animal in the field; shot wild boar should be brought to dedicated authorised dressing facilities limiting loss of body fluids (including blood).
5. After dressing the wild boar, the place and equipment used (including transport vehicles) should be washed and disinfected with authorized disinfectants.
6. Animal by products should be collected and processed in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009.
7. Biosecurity measures shall be applied when searching for and handling wild boar carcasses to avoid possible contamination of vehicles, yards and houses.
   * 1. **Sampling of wild boar in Member States covered by Decision 2014/709/EU as follows:**
8. Principle of sampling in the whole country (areas regulated by Decision 2014/709/EU and free areas of the same Member State) should be based on enhanced passive surveillance: all found dead and sick wild boar have to be tested for ASF using PCR. In areas included in Parts II and III of the Annex of Decision 2014/709/EU, sampling in case of group of wild boar found dead simultaneously on the same spot can be pooled for PCR testing from a representative sample of the group.
9. Additional sampling (active surveillance) from hunted animals has to be performed as regulated by Decision 2014/709/EU. In areas of Part I of the Annex to Decision 2014/709/EU all hunted animals which are intended to be taken out of that area must be tested for ASF (PCR). In areas of Part II and III of the Annex to Decision 2014/709/EU sampling of all hunted animals and of all found dead/sick animals has to be conducted (100% sampling and testing by PCR). The hunted animals of these areas should be tested additionally for antibodies against ASF virus.
10. From hunted animals only blood samples are requested (organs in case of blood samples unavailable).
    * 1. **Removal of wild boar carcasses in Member States covered by Decision 2014/709/EU:**
11. Carcass finding and safe disposal to be carried out at least in the areas listed in the annex of Decision 2014/709/EU and in any at risk area as defined by the competent authority. The impact of this measure is more effective the sooner after the death of the animal that its carcass is removed.
12. In case of detection of ASF in unaffected areas, the passive finding of carcasses should be supplemented by active search by professionals in hotspots established by the competent authority.
13. The disposal of carcasses to be carried out either by burial, bringing to the rendering plant or burning (under supervision of the competent veterinary authorities). Possible use of appropriate chemicals for local disinfection.
    * 1. Relevant terms and definitions.

**Baiting:** (non-sustaining feeding of wild boar): Attracting of wild boar with limited food (e.g. maize) only for the purpose of hunting, trapping or culling. The maximum amount of food should not exceed 10kg/km2/month. Baiting should not in any case, represent a source of feeding wild boar for sustaining the population during winter.

**Culling of wild boar:** shooting of wild boar with the intention of collecting and rendering the whole carcass (no dressing takes place).

**Dead wild boar:** according to the level of risk each wild boar carcass should be managed in line to this strategic approach (e.g. dead wild boar in free areas or in infected area)

**Risk**: each country should perform a risk assessment to define its own level of risk[[9]](#footnote-10)

**Feeding places/devises for other species:** (e.g. wild ruminants): Such feeding places for wild ruminants should not be accessible for wild boar. The feed should not be attractive for wild boar (e.g. hay).

**Trapping:** catching wild boar with traps.

Annex I

KEY MESSAGES FOR AWARENESS RAISING CAMPAINGS IN MEMBER STATES[[10]](#footnote-11), [[11]](#footnote-12).

RELEVANCE OF THE DISEASE:

ASF is a devastating, usually deadly, infectious disease of pigs and wild boar; it represents a serious threat to pig farmers worldwide; it does not affect humans nor other species but there is no treatment or vaccine for ASF. The disease can cause severe health impact on farms, disruption of international trade of animals and animal products, and massive economic losses.

The pig sector is one of the most economically significant farming sectors in the EU.

* It represents 8.5% of the total output of the EU agricultural industry, the highest when compared to other meat sector (year 2016, source DG AGRI).
* Pigmeat accounts for 50% of total EU meat production (year 2018, data source DG AGRI).
* Pigmeat is the most exported of all the meats produced in the EU: it represents 59% of EU total meat exports (year 2018, data source DG AGRI).
* During the planning of awareness campaigns the importance of the pig sector at local level and not only at EU level should be highlighted.

The awareness campaigns should be built on facts (e.g. ASF kills pigs and wild boar, can hamper livelihood of farmers, can make local wild boar population decrease significantly or even disappear) to inform, educate and motivate all stakeholders in order to increase surveillance and reporting, enhance prevention practice and prevent further spread and introduction of ASF in new areas.

Particular relevance should be given to the reasons and benefits for stakeholders to act, and disadvantages if actions against ASF are not taken.

Communication should be frequent, multiple communication channels should be properly chosen. Opportunities for audience feedback and evaluation should be created.

Awareness campaigns should be periodically reviewed to take into account new information.

Awareness campaigns should be tailored to reach the intended target audience. The main target groups should include:

1. VETERINARIANS (public and private)

Why should ASF be stopped?

* ASF represents a serious threat to pig farming.
* There are no treatments or vaccines for ASF.
* The disease can cause massive economic losses at local, national and EU level.

What veterinary services should do to stop ASF?

* Perform surveillance.
* Ensure transparent and prompt reporting of suspicions.
* Contribute to and monitor awareness campaigns.
* Apply biosecurity measures between visits (bio-hygienic measures)[[12]](#footnote-13).
* Ensure and advice to enhance biosecurity4 in holdings.

Suggested communication tools:

* Press material, articles, media buying in specialised magazines and regional/local media
* Print material: Posters, Leaflets, Factsheets -to be distributed by targeted mailing to veterinarian associations
* Organisation of events, seminars training, conferences for this target
* Online web and social media
* Short videos and animations –only if distributed to target

1. FARMERS

Why should ASF be stopped?

* ASF represents a serious threat to pig farming.
* The disease can cause massive economic losses (direct and indirect).
* ASF can threaten farmer's livelihood.

What farmers should do to stop ASF?

* Report signs and symptoms of African swine fever or abnormal mortality.
* Make sure that all leftover food is put in sealed waste containers and not feed to domestic and feral pigs.
* Ensure and enhance biosecurity4 at farm level as agreed with competent authority.

Suggested communication tools:

* Press material, articles, media buying in specialised magazines and regional/local media
* Print material: Posters, Leaflets, Factsheets -to be distributed by targeted mailing to farmers associations
* Organisation of events, seminars training, conferences for this target
* Online web and social media

Short videos and animations –only if distributed to target

1. HUNTERS

Why should ASF be stopped?

* To avoid restriction or ban of hunting, limitations for hunting tourism and significant economic losses to the hunting sector in infected areas.
* Because of ASF the disease wild boar populations can decrease significantly or even disappear.
* Infected wild boar contaminate the environment making more likely secondary outbreaks in domestic pigs.
* If ASF is not contained in limited area, the virus might persist in the environment for a long time with a very difficult exit strategy.

What hunters should do to stop ASF?

* Collaborate with the competent authority in the finding, rapid reporting and safe removal from the environment of wild boar carcasses.
* Clean and disinfect equipment, clothes, vehicle and trophies on site and always before leaving the area.
* Eviscerate shot wild boar in the designated dressing area of the hunting ground.
* Contribute to the gradual reduction of the wild boar density in the areas not yet affected by the disease, including targeted hunting of adult and sub-adult females.
* Do not feed wild boar throughout the whole year.

Suggested communication tools:

* Press material, articles, media buying in specialised magazines and regional/local media
* Print material: Posters, Leaflets, Factsheets -to be distributed by targeted mailing to hunters associations, but also in airports, train stations, other transport facilities, including borders and in natural areas near wild boar
* Organisation of events, seminars training, conferences for this target
* Online web and social media
* Short videos and animations –only if distributed to target

1. GENERAL PUBLIC (Including travellers and transporters of feeds/foods)

Why should ASF be stopped?

* To actively participate in protecting and animal health and pig producers livelihood.
* To actively contribute to stop ASF causing massive economic losses.
* To comply with legislation.

What the general public should do to stop ASF?

* Do not introduce live pigs or pigs' products (fresh pork, refrigerated or frozen pork, sausages, ham salt-cured meat, pig fat) from extra EU territories.
* Only move pork and other pig products from ASF restricted areas only if it is labelled with the EU oval stamp.
* Do not leave food in area accessible to wild boar

Suggested communication tools:

* Online web and social media
* Short videos and animations –to be displayed when general public is travelling –airports, train stations and other transport facilities, including borders- in natural areas near wild boar or in super markets
* Press material, articles, media buying in travel, food or environmental magazines
* Print material: Posters, Leaflets, Factsheets -to be distributed in transport facilities, supermarkets or natural parks

Annex II

MAIN MEASURES FOR ASF PREVENTION AND EARLY DETECTION IN MEMBER STATES FREE FROM ASF

The main measures in Member States free from ASF should be aiming for best prevention practice, early detection and to preparedness for the possible occurrence of ASF in previously free areas. These measures should be coupled to the ones taken in free areas as described in section c. and adapted to the specific situation in each Member State or region. Particular attention should be given to the management of wild boar populations, pig farming sector and targeted public awareness campaigns. The main measures should include:

1. MANAGEMENT OF WILD BOAR

* The risk and the consequences of any new introduction of ASF in an ASF-free wild boar population should be effectively minimised through preventive long-term actions aimed at reducing wild boar population density in ASF-free areas. This long-term management requires coordination with other stakeholders such as forestry management bodies and hunters and is essential for both prevention and early detection of ASF. Therefore, cooperation on the management of wild boar from both the agricultural and environmental sides is essential and it should start when Member State or region is still free from ASF.
* Hunters should be aware of the risks related to ASF and should be trained to actively contribute to passive surveillance, active dissemination of information and adapt their practices to the possible disease situation. They should enforce wild boar management practices and biosecurity measures aimed at minimising the risk of the disease entering into new areas.
* Biosecurity during hunting should be enhanced gradually going towards what is described in point 3.1.4. and in the GF-TADs “Handbook on ASF in wild boar and biosecurity during hunting” . Efforts should be undertaken to establish a dialogue and promote the importance of these measures to the hunting society.
* The efforts (hunting management, ban of supplementary feeding, agricultural practises) in ASF free areas should be undertaken to reduce wild boar populations, where appropriate. Intensive hunting of adult and sub-adult females and not feeding wild boar should be implemented to reduce the population density and the risks of ASF, as highlighted in the scientific opinion of EFSA of July 2018[[13]](#footnote-14). A long-term management strategy of wild boar population, including its appropriate reduction should be determined after an assessment of the potential effects, specific objectives, measures and joint programmes of cooperation between the agriculture and environmental sector (hunting management, ban of supplementary feeding, agricultural practises) tailored to the particular situation of the Member State.[[14]](#footnote-15)
* Due to possible spreading of the disease through infected material (for ex. infected pork or wild boar meat/products), certain risk mitigating measures should be taken along major land infrastructure routes, such as international communication roads, and related road networks, in particular in forestry areas. For example, these measures could include:
  + - fencing of parking places in forestry areas,
    - limited access of animals to food waste bins,
    - increased frequency of food waste collection from parking places in forestry areas and rendering of such food waste.

1. PUBLIC AWARENESS

* Specific trainings should be organised for targeted groups (at least for official and private veterinarians, commercial and non-commercial farmers, hunters, forestry guards) to inform about the risks of ASF and possible prevention, biosecurity and control measures.
* Specific and targeted awareness-raising campaigns should be tailored according to the specific situation in each Member State and are already compulsory in all Member States under EU legislation[[15]](#footnote-16).
* Member States should ensure that on all major land infrastructure routes, such as international communication roads, and related road networks, appropriate information on the risks of the transmission of African swine fever and on the relevant control measures are brought to the attention of all travellers in a visible and prominent manner. In particular, that information must be presented in a way that is easily understood by travellers coming from, and going to, the areas of Member States that are affected by the disease or are at the high risk or from third countries at risk of the spread of ASF (see Annex I on key messages for awareness raising campaigns in Member States).
* Possible spreading of the disease through infected pork or wild boar meat thrown away by humans (for example, travellers or professional drivers) entering the EU or also travelling within Member States, along European roads, through the habitats of wild boar deserves particular and urgent attention. This source of spreading is defined as ‘human factor’, and it can be the origin of unexpected long distance spread of ASF in Member States. Relevant routine public awareness campaigns should raise awareness of the risk of ASF along major highways. For example, this could include:
  + - banners on the highways,
    - specific posters in the parking places in a forestry areas,
    - specific information campaigns in gas stations in forestry areas,
    - information to the professional long-distance drivers via national transport associations.

1. PIG FARMING SECTOR

* Review and update the ASF contingency plans to ensure they respond the actual needs with:
  + - an updated chain of command,
    - an updated biosecurity measures in case of outbreak,
    - pre-approved solutions for culling and disposing of pigs in case of outbreaks (for example, supply of gas, pre-agreed burial places),
    - availability of staff and equipment for emergency operations,
    - relevant communications strategies,
    - collaboration with other public institutions (for ex. in charge of environment, transport, agriculture, customs and border protection and etc.).
* Bearing in mind the minimum biosecurity requirements provided under point 2.1.2., set up a dialogue with the commercial and non-commercial pig sector in order to enhance awareness and gradually bring to an upscaling of the biosecurity measures in the Member States.
* Ensure minimum requirements are in place for an effective passive surveillance in pig holdings. Review the number of samples tested regularly to assess the effectiveness of the passive surveillance in place and assess the use of tools to enhance reporting rate (e.g. awareness campaigns, incentives).
* Based on a risk analysis, set up the appropriate frequency of inspection of both commercial and non-commercial holdings in order to promote awareness and biosecurity for pig farms.
* If necessary, review of national legislation to allow preventive slaughter or preventive killing of pigs should take place.

1. OTHER

* Implement official controls at borders to detect undeclared goods (food) that may be contaminated by ASF and are derived from pigs (pork, and wild boar ham, sausages, bacon, etc.). This activity should be complemented by the use of the Risk Information Form (RIF) that the Commission issued through the EU Customs Risk Management System (CRMS) for the custom services of the EU.
* Enhanced cooperation and public awareness on ASF risks and control measures with relevant public institutions (for ex. in charge of environment, transport, agriculture, customs and border protection, military trainings and movements) and relevant stakeholders (for ex. farmers, hunters, forestry guards, private veterinarians, professional long-distance drivers) should take place in Member States, where appropriate.
* Enhanced cooperation on ASF with neighbouring Member States and/or third countries is of paramount importance for the agreement on cross-border measures.

Annex III

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Topics** | | **Free area (far away from infected areas)** | **Free area close to infected area** | **Newly infected area** | **Area where the disease is present for more than one year** |
| **Sustained Feeding** | | Banned | Banned | Banned | Banned |
| **Baiting** | | Only for trapping | Only for trapping and for culling | Only for trapping and for culling | Only for trapping and for culling |
| **Hunting** | **Aim** | Increase hunting effort to decrease WB\* population | Intensive hunting (maximal hunting effort) | Total ban of hunt until the epidemic phase has decreased | Allowed, but only under strict biosecurity measures finalised to collect samples for testing. |
| **Degree of effort** | Increase hunting bag (quantitative effort) | Driven and solo hunts | Culling only after the epidemic phase has decreased |  |
| **Methods** | Target female and sub-adults (qualitative effort) by usual hunting methods | Hunting at the highest level achievable in that area. Private/public involvement to achieve the objective to reduce wild boar | No Driven hunts |  |
| **Coordination** | Addressed and coordinated by CA\*\* | Wild boar management addressed and encouraged through CA oversight (involving public and private sectors) to reach population reduction goals, the hunters are considered part of the strategy |  |  |
| **Biosecurity** | | Promoted, encouraged and sustained by CA | All that is in the strategy | All that is in the strategy | Required during hunting and carcass removal |
| **Restriction of areas** | | No | Managed by the CA according to specific procedures | Area restricted Only authorised staff in the area Farmland can have access on the basis of derogation | Managed by the CA according to specific procedures |
| **Trapping** | | Culling and testing by Competent Authority carcass for personal consumption if negative | Culling and testing by Competent Authority carcass for personal consumption if negative | Culling and testing by Competent Authority carcass for personal consumption if negative | Culling and testing by Competent Authority carcass for personal consumption if negative |
| **culling** | | Yes, is up to competent authority | Yes, is up to competent authority | Allowed to eradicate when the endemic phase has been reached (after the epidemic phase) and under the supervision of CA. In practice no actions until the decreasing of the epidemic curve is consolidated and identified through a continuous system of passive surveillance | Yes |
| **Fencing** | | Refer to EFSA for large scale fences. Depend to epidemiological factors | Country to decide to delimit small areas to facilitate control measures | Defined areas. Timely built to slow down the disease speeding and anticipating the Epi-wave. Addressed to limit the spread.  Compliant to EU for environment | No |
| **Carcasses** | | The carcasses should be managed by the CA according to specific procedures | Disposal of all carcasses | Disposal of all carcasses | If results are negative are for personal consumption if positive should be destroyed |
| **Surveillance** | | Promote passive surveillance | Promote passive surveillance | Promote passive surveillance | Promote passive surveillance |
| All wild boar found dead sampled and tested | Active patrolling to find dead wild boar and all dead wild boar tested | Active patrolling to find dead wild boar and all dead wild boar tested | Active patrolling to find dead wild boar and all dead wild boar tested |
| Results of tests max 72h from sampling | Results of tests max 72h from sampling | Results of tests max 72h from sampling |  |
| **Key data** | | All wild boar found dead sampled and tested | All wild boar found dead sampled and tested All hunted wild boar tested for ASF Ag | All wild boar found dead and culled: sampled and tested All hunted wild boar tested | All wild boar found dead and culled: sampled and tested All hunted wild boar tested |
| **Testing** | | Ag detection | Ag detection | Ag detection + Ab detection | Ag detection + Ab detection |

\*WB : Wild boar

\*\*CA : Competent Authority

1. Council Directive 2002/60/EC of 27 June 2002 laying down specific provisions for the control of African swine fever and amending Directive 92/119/EEC as regards Teschen disease and African swine fever (OJ L 192, 20.7.2002, p. 27). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. Commission Implementing Decision 2014/709/EU of 9 October 2014 concerning animal health control measures relating to African swine fever in certain Member States and repealing Implementing Decision 2014/178/EU (OJ L 295, 11.10.2014, p. 63). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. EFSA Scientific Reports and Scientific Opinions: Scientific Report on Epidemiological analyses of African swine fever in the Baltic States and Poland (published on 7 November 2017); Simulation-based investigation of ASF spread and control in wildlife without consideration of human non-compliance to biosecurity (published on 7 November 2017); Epidemiological analyses on African swine fever in the Baltic countries and Poland (published on 23 March 2017); African swine fever (published on 14 July 2015); African swine fever (published on 7 April 2014); Mitigation measures for African swine fever virus in wild boar (published on 17 March 2014); Ticks as vectors of CCHF and ASF (published on 10 August 2010); African Swine Fever (published on 22 March 2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Originating from areas where ASF has been reported. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Originating from areas where ASF has been reported. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. EFSA Journal 2018;16(11):5494 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. EFSA Journal 2018;16(11):5494 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. As described in Council Directive 2002/60/EC. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. EFSA Journal 2018;16(11):5494 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. <http://web.oie.int/rr-europe/eng/regprog/en_ASF_depository.htm#ASFcampaignmaterial> [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. <https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/health/regulatory_committee/presentations_en> [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. <https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/animals/docs/ad_control-measures_asf_wrk-doc-sante-2015-7113.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. <https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/5344> [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/animals/docs/ad\_control-measures\_asf\_conf-20181219\_statement.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. Article 15a of Commission Implementing Decision 2014/709/EU of 9 October 2014 concerning animal health control measures relating to African swine fever in certain Member States and repealing Implementing Decision 2014/178/EU (OJ L 295, 11.10.2014, p. 63) [↑](#footnote-ref-16)